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CROWN COPYRIGHT   
 
Anne Fitzgerald 1 
 
 
Copyright protects much of the creative, cultural, educational, scientific and 
informational material generated by federal, State/Territory and local governments 
and their constituent departments and agencies.  Governments at all levels develop, 
manage and distribute a vast array of materials in the form of documents, reports, 
websites, datasets and databases on CD or DVD and files that can be downloaded from 
a website.  
Under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) , with few exceptions government copyright is 
treated the same as copyright owned by non-government parties insofar as the range 
of protected materials and the exclusive proprietary rights attaching to them are 
concerned. However, the rationale for recognizing copyright in public sector materials 
and vesting ownership of copyright in governments is fundamentally different to the 
main rationales underpinning copyright generally. The central justification for 
recognizing Crown copyright is to ensure that government documents and materials 
created for public administrative purposes are disseminated in an accurate and reliable 
form. Consequently, the exclusive rights held by governments as copyright owners 
must be exercised in a manner consistent with the rationale for conferring copyright 
ownership on them. Since Crown copyright exists primarily to ensure that documents 
and materials produced for use in the conduct of government are circulated in an 
accurate and reliable form, governments should exercise their exclusive rights to 
ensure that their copyright materials are made available for access and reuse, in 
accordance with any laws and policies relating to access to public sector materials.  
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While copyright law vests copyright owners with extensive bundles of exclusive rights 
which can be exercised to prevent others making use of the copyright material, in the 
case of Crown copyright materials these rights should rarely be asserted by 
government to deviate from the general rule that Crown copyright materials will be 
available for “full and free reproduction” by the community at large.   
GOVERNMENT COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP 
Ownership of copyright by government agencies is dealt with in Part VII of the 
Copyright Act 1968  (Cth) (the “Crown copyright” provisions).2  While the power to 
legislate in relation to copyright is a concurrent power under s 51 (xviii) of the 
Commonwealth Constitution, s 109 provides that “when a law of a State is inconsistent 
with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, be invalid”.   Since the Commonwealth has enacted a 
comprehensive legislative framework governing copyright, any State legislation 
dealing with subsistence, ownership or infringement of copyright or limits to its scope 
would be invalid by virtue of s 109 of the Constitution.    
The principal provisions on which government copyright is based are ss 176 – 179 of 
the Copyright Act 1968.   Sections 176 and 178 provide that the government owns 
copyright in literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, sound recordings and films 
“made by, or under the direction or control of the Commonwealth or a State”. Section 
177 further provides that the government owns copyright in a literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work that is first published in Australia “by, or under the direction 
or control of, the Commonwealth or a State”.3  The operation of ss 176– 178 can be 
displaced by an agreement between the government and the person who created the 
copyright material that copyright is to belong to that person or some other party 
specified in the agreement.4   The effect of these provisions is that governments own 
copyright in a vast range of materials in hard copy and digital form, including 
legislation, judgments, parliamentary materials, reports of government-commissioned 
                                                             
2 See generally, A Fitzgerald, B Fitzgerald and N Hooper (2010) Enabling open access to public sector 
information with Creative Commons Licences: the Australian Experience, in Access to Public Sector 
Information:  Law, Technology & Policy,  Sydney University Press, eprints.qut.edu.au/29773/; A 
Fitzgerald and K Pappalardo, (2009) “Report to the Government 2.0 Taskforce: Project 4 – Copyright 
Law and Intellectual Property”, eprints.qut.edu.au/29416/. 
3 Sections 176–178 are subject to any agreement between the Crown and the maker of the work 
or subject matter under which it is agreed that copyright is to belong to the author or maker or 
some other specified person (s 179). 
4 Copyright Act 1968, s 179. 
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review bodies, art works, computer programs, digital databases, photos and 
audiovisual works.5   
These materials come into existence in different ways.  A large amount of material is 
created within government, through the efforts of government employees and other 
persons who are not employed by government but produce copyright materials while 
working as volunteers (for example, interns, students on work experience placements 
and members of emergency services teams6).  However, a significant part of the 
materials held by government is produced externally, by recipients of government 
funding (such as research institutes) and persons who make submissions to inquiries 
and online consultations. Governments commonly commission independent 
contractors to produce materials and enter into arrangements to fund work in 
universities and research institutes that results in output in the form of reports, 
academic publications and data.  An important category of material is prepared by 
non-government parties and lodged with government pursuant to a statutory or 
regulatory direction to provide information or a report (for example, environmental 
impact assessments and information about water use, greenhouse gas emissions and 
results of mineral or petroleum exploration activities).7   
RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENTS AS COPYRIGHT OWNERS 
As the Copyright Act 1968 does not generally differentiate between the rights of 
government as copyright owner and the rights of private parties who own copyright, 
governments enjoy the same range of exclusive rights in their copyright materials as 
private sector copyright owners.8 One of the few points of difference between the 
rights of government and private sector copyright owners is that the duration of 
                                                             
5 For a listing of the various kinds of copyright materials produced by or for governments, see 
Copyright Law Review Committee, Crown Copyright, 2005 at pp 10-11. 
6 For example, emergency services volunteers typically vastly outnumber departmental employees 
(by as much as a factor of 10) and produce risk management plans, incident reports, news 
updates and other copyright materials. 
7 There are numerous examples of documents of this kind, including mining and petroleum 
exploration reports, flood studies, soil surveys, traffic analysis reports, noise studies, cultural 
heritage assessments, environmental impact statements, licence applications (eg for liquor 
licences, certified traders, etc). 
8Section 182 specifically states that, apart from the provisions in Part VII of the Copyright Act 
1968 (in ss 176-181) relating to the subsistence, duration and ownership of copyright, the 
provisions of Part III and Part IV of the Act apply. 
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copyright for materials within the scope of ss 176 – 178 is 50 years from the end of the 
calendar year in which the copyright item is first published or is made.9    
The primary rights of copyright are the rights to: 
 reproduce; 
 publish;  
 publicly perform; 
 make an adaptation; and 
 communicate the copyright work to the public in electronic form (eg on a 
website or as a digital file).10 
Other rights of copyright owners are the rights to ensure that electronic rights 
management information (ERMI) is not removed or altered and to prevent the 
circumvention of technological protection measures (TPM) they apply to their 
copyright materials to control access to or copying of it. ERMI is electronic 
information (including numbers or codes representing such information) which is 
either attached to or embodied in the copyright material, or appears in connection 
with a communication or the making available of the copyright material.11 It typically 
includes information identifying the copyright work, its author or copyright owner or 
indicating the terms and conditions on which the material can be used, or that the use 
of the material is subject to terms or conditions of use.  It is an infringement of the 
copyright owner’s rights to remove or alter ERMI relating to a copyright work or other 
subject matter without the permission of the copyright owner or exclusive licensee, if 
the person doing the act knows or ought reasonably to have known that the removal 
or alteration would induce, enable, facilitate or conceal an infringement of copyright.12 
In certain circumstances the removal or altering ERMI relating to a copyright work 
may be a criminal offence under the Copyright Act.13 The anti-circumvention 
provisions enable copyright owners to protect their materials by applying technical 
measures that control access to or copying of the work. It is an infringement to 
knowingly deal in devices designed to circumvent TPMs14 and, where the TPM 
                                                             
9 Copyright Act 1968, ss 180, 181. 
10 Copyright Act 1968, ss 31, 85-88. 
11 The main provisions dealing with ERMI are set out in Division 2A, Subdivision B of the 
Copyright Act 1968. Section 116D sets out the legal remedies (including an injunction or 
damages) available for the removal of and interference with ERMI.  
12 Copyright Act 1968, ss 116B-116D. 
13 Copyright Act 1968, ss 132AQ-132AS. 
14 Copyright Act 1968, s 116AO(1). 
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controls access to a copyright work, it is an infringement to knowingly circumvent the 
TPM.15 
As well as the rights described above, individual authors of copyright works can 
exercise moral rights, which are personal to the author and cannot be transferred. 
Although government does not, itself, have moral rights, it may own copyright in 
materials in respect of which individual authors can continue to exercise their moral 
rights. This situation may arise where government obtains an assignment of copyright 
in materials that have been produced by an individual author who has not agreed to 
waive the exercise of their moral rights.  As moral rights cannot be assigned, if the 
author has not agreed to waive them, they will continue to be exercisable by the 
author. The moral rights that can be exercised by individual authors are the rights:    
 of attribution, that is to be attributed (accredited) as the author of the work, 
where reasonable;  
 to object to false attribution, that is to prevent someone else being wrongly 
identified as the author of the work; and  
 of integrity, that is to prevent derogatory treatment of the work that would 
prejudice the author’s reputation.16 
RATIONALE FOR GOVERNMENT COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP 
Although the rights exercisable by governments as copyright owners under the 
provisions of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) are for most purposes identical to those of 
private parties, there are fundamental differences between government and private 
copyright. The Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) does not generally differentiate between 
public and private sector parties either with respect to the scope of materials in which 
copyright subsists or the exclusive rights that can be exercised in respect of them.  
However, it would be a mistake to assume that government copyright is exactly the 
same as copyright in non-government materials.  Although statutory recognition of 
government copyright ownership was introduced into Australian copyright law in 
1912 when the Copyright Act 1911 (UK) was adopted in Australia (No. 20 of 1912), the 
rationale for copyright in government materials is quite different from the reasons 
why copyright in recognized in materials produced by individual authors and private 
sector organizations. 
 An obvious point of difference is that, since many government materials (eg reports, 
legislation, handbooks) are created in the ordinary course of activities by parliament, 
the courts and government agencies, the traditional justification of copyright as 
                                                             
15 Copyright Act 1968, s 116AN(1). 
16 Copyright Act 1968, Part IX, ss 189-195AZR. 
167 
providing an incentive to produce and disseminate new information is much less 
relevant than for works produced by publishers with the expectation of a commercial 
return.17  In fact, discussion of government copyright is strikingly lacking in the usual 
rationales for recognition of copyright generally such as encouragement of innovation 
or enterprise for commercial benefit; reward of creative effort; maximizing 
commercial return through sale or licensing; and securing some advantage through 
the exercise of the exclusive rights. 
As observed by the Copyright Law Review (CLRC) in its Crown Copyright report 
(2005), works such as legislation and judgments “will be produced regardless of 
financial incentives, and therefore the traditional justification for copyright ownership 
does not apply”.  Similarly the Prices Surveillance Authority in its report, Inquiry into 
the Publications Pricing Policy of the Australian Government Publishing Service (1992), 
observed that the traditional rationale behind copyright law does not apply to material 
produced by the government itself: 
There appears to be less justification for the existence of Crown copyright 
than copyright in general ... The information being copyrighted has been 
developed not by private individuals but by tax payer funded sources. 
Copyright monopoly rights are not necessary to ensure incentive for 
adequate developments of such information. It is information produced 
using public money to facilitate government. Such information should be 
freely available.18  
Government copyright has its origins in the Crown prerogative.19 The scope of the 
Crown prerogatives is uncertain, and they may change over time.  It is generally 
accepted that the prerogatives are not lost by disuse but must be expressly removed by 
statute.20  The Crown prerogative in the nature of copyright arose from the Crown’s 
role in “ensur[ing] the integrity and authenticity of official government 
publications”.21  As Monotti explains, from the late 18th century:  
                                                             
17 Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC), Crown Copyright, 2005, para 4.23 at p38:  
www.clrc.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/RWPBB79ED8E4858F514CA25735100827559 .  
18 Prices Surveillance Authority, Inquiry into the Publications Pricing Policy of the Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Report No. 47, 19 December 1992, at p 91.  
19 For discussion of the Crown prerogative, see CLRC, Crown Copyright, 2005, Chapter 6. See also 
J Gilchrist, Crown Copyright: An Analysis of rights vesting in the Crown under statute and 
common law and their interrelationship, LLM thesis, Monash University,  1983; H V Evatt, The 
Royal Prerogative, Law Book Co, 1987 (publication of H V Evatt’s doctoral thesis, Certain aspects 
of the Royal Prerogative: a study in constitutional law, 1924). 
20 See CLRC, Crown Copyright, Chapter 6, at pp 90–91. 
21 CLRC, Crown Copyright, 2005, para 4.66 at p 53. 
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a consistent theme emerged, namely that the sovereign has a duty, based on 
the grounds of public utility and necessity, to superintend and ensure 
authentic and accurate publication of matters of national and public 
concern relating to the government, state and the Church of England. That 
duty carries with it a corresponding prerogative which is not specifically 
defined in any of the cases, but clearly extends to publishing and printing 
that material.22   
This understanding of the prerogative accords with the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales in Attorney-General (NSW) v Butterworth & Co (Australia) 
Ltd23, where Long Innes CJ stated that the Crown prerogative stems from the historic 
duty of the monarch “to superintend the publication of acts of the legislature and acts 
of state of that description, carrying with it a corresponding prerogative”.24  Over the 
years, the scope of the prerogative was cut back, such that, as explained in Copyright 
Agency Limited v State of New South Wales: 25 
[b]y 1911 the Crown only claimed the exclusive right to publish the 
following works:  the authorised version of the Bible (The Universities of 
Oxford and Cambridge v Richardson (1802) 6 Ves 689; (1802) 31 ER 1260); 
Acts of Parliament (Basket v Cambridge University (1758) 1 W Bl 105; 
(1758) 96 ER 59); proclamations (Grierson v Jackson (1794) Ridg. L. & S. 
304); law books (Roper v Streater (1672) Skin 234; discussed in (1672) 90 ER 
107); Millar v Taylor (1769) 4 Burr 2303; (1769) 98 ER 201); almanacs 
(Gurney v Longman (1806) 13 Ves 493; (1806) 33 ER 379); and what were 
compendiously described as government publications. 
The Crown prerogative is preserved under s 8A of the Copyright Act 196826 and its 
operation is not otherwise affected by the Act.  
These insights into the nature of the Crown prerogative with respect to official 
documents resonate with a theme that permeates the commentary on statutory Crown 
copyright in Australia and other jurisdictions:  continued recognition of government 
copyright is justified by the “need to ensure the integrity and authenticity of official 
                                                             
22 See A Monotti, Nature and Basis of Crown Copyright in Official Publications [1992] 9 EIPR 305, 
at pp 306-307.  Note though that, in Australia, the Crown prerogative was never considered to 
apply to religious works, as there is no established state religion: CLRC, Crown Copyright, 2005 at 
para 6.07, p 88. 
23 (1937) 38 SR (NSW) 195.  
24 Ibid, p. 229. 
25 [2007] FCAFC 80 per Finkelstein J at para 179.  
26 Section 8A was inserted into the Act by the Copyright Amendment Act 1980.  Previously, Crown 
prerogative was preserved by s 8(2) of the Copyright Act 1968. 
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government publications”.27   The need to ensure the reproduction and distribution of 
government materials in an accurate and reliable form is a constant concern in 
discussions about the existence and exercise of government copyright.  Familiar 
phrases recur: the need to ensure the authentic and accurate publication of documents, 
to be able to rely on the veracity and accuracy of government materials and to indicate 
the status and authority of government materials. 
Academic commentators28 and many submissions to the CLRC’s review of Crown 
copyright supported the view that the integrity and authenticity of government 
copyright materials can be ensured by distribution under copyright licensing 
conditions which enable infringement actions to be brought for misuse or 
misrepresentation of the material.29 For example, the Victorian Government’s 
submission stated that: 
[t]he State must ensure the continued integrity and authenticity of official 
government publications so that the public can be aware of the status of 
each publication. Continuing to maintain Crown copyright is essential to 
achieving [this] outcome.30 
The justification for Crown copyright as providing a safeguard for the “integrity and 
authenticity” of official works has consistently been raised in the United Kingdom 
(even if no further rights existed in such works).31  In 1996, Gordon Robbie (then) 
Head of Copyright in Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), explained: 
[C]opyright is … a means by which copyright holders can ensure that their 
material is used properly and responsibly by third parties. This is of 
particular importance where that material is authoritative, and where the 
general public, in one way or the other, are placing reliance on its veracity 
                                                             
27 See Copyright Law Review Committee, Crown Copyright, 2005 para 4.66 at p 53, available at 
www.clrc.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/RWPBB79ED8E4858F514CA25735100827559 . 
28 See J Gilchrist, The role of government as proprietor and disseminator of information, (1996) vol. 
7, no. 1, Australian Journal of Corporate Law pp 62-79, at p 79. On this point, see also J 
Bannister, Open Access to Legal Sources in Australasia: Current Debate on Crown Copyright and 
the Case of the Anthropomorphic Postbox (1996) 3 Journal of Information, Law and Technology 
(JILT), available at www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1996_3/bannister/. Bannister is 
commenting on Baillieu and Poggioli (of and on behalf of the Liberal Party of Australia, Victorian 
Division) v Australian Electoral Commission and Commonwealth of Australia [1996] FCA 1202.  
29 See CLRC, Crown Copyright, 2005, footnote 93, para 4.66 at p 53. 
30 See CLRC, Crown Copyright, 2005, para 4.68, at p 53, referring to Submission 64 at p 1.  
31 See S Picciotto,’Towards Open Access to British Official Documents’, 1996 (2) Journal of 
Information Law and Technology (JILT), available at 
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1996_2/picciotto/.  
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and accuracy. The Copyright Unit [of HMSO] does come across cases of 
abuse and is able to pursue and prevent them.32 
The 1999 UK White Paper, The future management of Crown copyright, referred, 
without explanation, to the need to “preserve the integrity and official status of 
government material”.33 It noted that there was a general perception among the public 
that Crown copyright “operates as a brand or kitemark of quality indicating the status 
and authority of much of the material produced by government”. 34 The justification of 
government copyright “as a means of retaining quality control over PSI and the way it 
is used” was raised more recently in the United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading’s 2006 
report, The Commercial Use of Public Information (CUPI), which found that improved 
availability of public sector information for commercial reuse was not incompatible 
with the continued recognition of Crown copyright.35 The CUPI report made 
recommendations on improving the commercial use of PSI without abolishing Crown 
copyright and stated that: 
[i]n fact, the existence of Crown copyright is a key part of the control 
mechanisms which we want to build on to ensure that [public sector 
information holders] act in a fair and transparent manner.36 
A similar approach to the justification for government copyright was taken in a study 
commissioned from KPMG by the Canadian Government in 2001.  The report 
recommended that digital geospatial data should be licensed to users at no cost for use 
and redistribution, and that copyright and licensing should continue to be used to 
protect the quality of geospatial data originating from government agencies, rather 
than to prevent use.37 
                                                             
32 G Robbie, Crown Copyright - Bête Noire or White Knight?, 1996 (2) The Journal of Information 
Law and Technology (JILT), available at 
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1996_2/special/robbie/.   
33 United Kingdom government, Minister for the Cabinet Office, The future management of 
Crown copyright, Cm 4300, HMSO, 1999 at para 5.1.  See also C Tullo, Crown copyright: the way 
forward – access to public sector information, The Law Librarian, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1998, 200–3, at 
p200. 
34 Ibid, para 5.1. 
35 United Kingdom government, Office of Fair Trading, The Commercial Use of Public 
Information, December 2006, at para 4.74, available at 
www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/publications/reports/consumer-protection/oft861. 
November 2009) . 
36 Ibid, para 4.76. 
37 KPMG Consulting, Executive Summary: Geospatial Data Policy Study - Project Report, 2001, 
recommendation 5 at p 25, available at 
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EXERCISE OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS BY GOVERNMENTS 
Although the same set of exclusive rights applies to the same materials, it was not 
intended that those rights would be exercised by governments in the same way as non-
government copyright owners exercise their exclusive rights. Just as the rationale for 
government copyright ownership differs from that for private sector copyright, there is 
clear evidence that it was intended that government rights would be exercised 
primarily to ensure the distribution of government publications in a reliable form.  
Research by Ben Atkinson and John Gilchrist has uncovered historical documents in 
the Federal Government’s archives, which strongly indicate that the concept of Crown 
copyright in United Kingdom and Australian law was, at least from the time it was 
first codified in statutory form, inextricably linked with what would now be termed 
“open content” licensing practices. At the time the first Crown copyright provisions 
were enacted in the United Kingdom and Australia, it was explained that the Crown’s 
rights would be exercised to permit the “full and free reproduction” and widespread 
dissemination of the great bulk of government copyright materials. 38   
A United Kingdom Treasury Minute of 191239 described the practice to be followed to 
give effect to s 18 of the United Kingdom Copyright Act 1911.40 The 1911 Copyright 
Act (UK) was adopted in Australia in 1912  (No 20 of 1912) and s 18 of that Act (the 
precursor to the current Crown copyright provisions in ss 176–179 of the Copyright 
Act) provided that: 
Without prejudice to any rights or privileges of the Crown, where any work 
has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, been prepared 
or published by or under the direction or control of His Majesty or any 
Government department, the copyright in the work shall, subject to any 
agreement with the author, belong to His Majesty, and in such case shall 
continue for a period of fifty years from the date of the first publication of 
the work. [emphasis added] 
                                                                                                                                                    
www.geoconnections.org/programsCommittees/proCom_policy/keyDocs/KPMG/KPMG_E.pdf .  
An earlier report produced for Industry Canada in 1995 by the Information Highway Advisory 
Council, The challenge of the information highway had recommended the retention of Crown 
copyright. See also A A Keyes and C Brunet, Copyright in Canada: Proposals for a Revision of the 
Law, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Ottawa, 1977, at p 225.  
38 See B Atkinson, The True History of Copyright: The Australian Experience 1905–2005, Sydney 
University Press, 2007 at p 277; B Fitzgerald, A Fitzgerald et al, Internet and E-Commerce Law: 
Technology, Law, and Policy, Lawbook Co/Thomson, Sydney, 2007 at pp 267-268.  
39 Dated 28 June 1912. 
40 1 & 2 Geo 5, Ch 46. 
172 
An earlier Treasury Minute presented to the House of Commons on 31 August 188741 
had identified seven classes of government publications in which the Crown claimed 
copyright: (1) reports of select committees of Parliament and of Royal Commissions; 
(2) papers required by statute to be laid before Parliament; (3) papers laid before 
Parliament by command; (4) Acts of Parliament; (5) official books; (6) literary and 
quasi-literary works; and (7) charts and ordnance maps. As noted by Finkelstein J in 
Copyright Agency Limited v New South Wales [2007] FCAFC 80 (at para 177):  
According to the Minute, Crown copyright would not be enforced in the 
first five classes but copyright in the last two would be strictly enforced. The 
Minute is reproduced in L.C.F. Oldfield, The Law of Copyright (1912) at 
111–113.  
Publications in the first five categories described in the Minute, such as reports of 
Select Committees or Royal Commissions and Acts of Parliament, were regarded as 
having been produced for the “use and information of the public and it [was] desirable 
that the knowledge of their contents should be diffused as widely as possible”. A 
“general rule permitting full and free reproduction” of such works was to apply and, 
while the rights of the Crown would continue, no steps would ordinarily be taken to 
enforce the Crown’s copyright. For works falling into the latter two categories – “often 
produced [by government] at considerable cost”42 – the government objected to their 
reproduction, “by private enterprise for the benefit of individual publishers”43 and 
made it clear that unauthorised reproduction would incur liability as if “the copyright 
had been in private hands”.44 
In December 1913, a copy of the 1912 UK Treasury Minute was brought to the notice 
of the Commonwealth Government by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to 
provide information on UK practice regarding Crown copyright.  In January 1914, 
Robert Garran, Secretary of the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, 
wrote to the Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, attaching a Minute on 
Crown Copyright and requesting that the Prime Minister communicate with the 
respective State Premiers on the subject. Copies of the United Kingdom Treasury 
                                                             
41 No 335 of 1887. This earlier Treasury Minute was referred to in the 1912 Treasury Minute. 
42 See G Robbie, Crown Copyright - Bête Noire or White Knight?, (1996) 2 Journal of Information Law 
and Technology (JILT) www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1996_2/special/robbie.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. Robbie quotes from a Treasury notice published in the London Gazette of 23 November 
1886: “Printers and Publishers are reminded that anyone reprinting without due authority matter 
which has appeared in any Government publication renders himself liable to the same penalties 
as those he might under like circumstances have incurred had the copyright been in private 
hands.” 
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Minute of 1912 were circulated by the Prime Minister to the States, attached to a letter 
dated 27 January 1914, informing them that the Commonwealth Government 
intended to follow the practice adopted in the United Kingdom. 
From the historical background to the Crown copyright provisions – which survive to 
the current day in much the same form as in 1912 – it is clear that they were enacted 
with the expectation that they would rarely be exercised to restrain reproduction and 
copying of government materials.   Although there is no clear statement of the 
circumstances in which governments may rely on their exclusive rights to restrain the 
unauthorised reproduction and distribution of their copyright materials, such 
instances would be limited.  
However, appreciation of the fact that Crown copyright is intended to encourage 
rather than deter the distribution and reuse of government materials seems to have 
diminished with the passage of time. The UK’s Power of Information Taskforce found 
that Crown copyright was often misunderstood by creators and reusers of data: 
When the public sector publishes information people should understand 
that it is intended for re-use … Crown copyright, despite its historic name, 
is designed to encourage re-use in the majority of cases.45 
Consequently, the Power of Information Taskforce Report (February 2009) 
recommended that steps should be taken to improve understanding of the permissive 
aspects of Crown copyright.46  
CAL v NSW 
The operation of the Crown copyright provisions in ss 176 – 179 of the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) was considered directly for the first time by the Full Federal Court in 
Copyright Agency Ltd v New South Wales (2007) 240 ALR 249; [2007] FCAFC 80, a 
case involving survey plans produced by surveyors and lodged with the Land and 
Property Information division of the State Department of Lands. Survey plans are 
protected under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) as artistic works.47 The New South 
Wales Government argued that it would not be liable to make payments to the 
Copyright Agency Ltd (CAL) (acting on behalf of surveyors) under the statutory 
licence in ss 183 and 183A of the Act if the survey plans were made or first published 
“by, or under the direction or control of” the State, as it would be the copyright owner 
                                                             
45 Ibid, p25. 
46 R Allan, Power of Information Taskforce Report, February 2009, recommendation 12 at p 7, 
available at poit.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/poit/category/final-introduction/.  
47 Copyright Act 1968, s 10(1) defines “artistic work” as including “a painting, sculpture, drawing, 
engraving or photograph, whether the work is of artistic quality or not”. 
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by virtue of ss 176 and 177 of the Copyright Act. The Full Court held that the survey 
plans could not be regarded as having been made or first published “by, or under the 
direction or control of the State” and the State did not therefore acquire copyright 
ownership through the operation of s 176 or 177 of the Copyright Act. 
In delivering the principal judgment, Emmett J (with whom Lindgren and Finkelstein 
JJ agreed) considered (at [122]) that the reference to works made “by” the Crown was 
concerned with “those circumstances where a servant or agent of the Crown brings the 
work into existence for and on behalf of the Crown”. The reference to works made 
under the “direction” or “control” of the Crown was concerned with situations “where 
the person making the work is subject to the direction or control of the Crown as to 
how the work is to be made” which, in the context of copyright law “may mean how 
the work is to be expressed in a material form”. Taking into account standard 
dictionary definitions of “direction” and “control”,48 Emmett J stated that the 
reference in ss 176 and 177 to a work being made under the direction or control of the 
Crown (as opposed to being made by the Crown) “must involve the concept of the 
Crown bringing about the making of the work” but did not “extend to the Crown 
laying down how a work is to be made, if a citizen chooses to make a work, without 
having any obligation to do so”. His Honour continued (at [126]): 
The question is whether the Crown is in a position to determine whether or 
not a work will be made, rather than simply determining that, if it is to be 
made at all, it will be made in a particular way or in accordance with 
particular specifications. The phrase “under the direction or control” does 
not include a factual situation where the Crown is able, de facto, to exercise 
direction or control because an approval or licence that is sought would not 
be forthcoming unless the Crown’s requirements for such approval or 
licence are satisfied. The phrase may not extend much, if at all, beyond 
commission, employment and analogous situations. It may merely 
concentrate ownership in the Crown to avoid the need to identify particular 
authors, employees or contracting parties.  
Finkelstein J also addressed the question of what works can be considered to be made 
under the direction or control of the Crown, stating (at [186]): 
There is probably a degree of overlap in the case of works made “under the 
direction of” or “under the control of” the Crown. Broadly speaking, 
however, where the Crown has power to require a work to come into 
existence, the work is made under the “direction” of the Crown. If the 
Crown has dominion over the execution of the work then it is made under 
                                                             
48 Copyright Agency Ltd v New South Wales (2007) 240 ALR 249; [2007] FCAFC 80 at [123], [124] per 
Emmett J. 
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its “control”. The assumption that underlies each concept (direction and 
control) is the existence of a relationship between the Crown and the author 
that authorises the Crown to give the direction or exercise the control as the 
case may be. That authority may be found in statute, including regulations 
made under a statute, contract or elsewhere. But, whatever its source may 
be, the authority must exist. 
Since the survey plans were prepared on the initiative of the surveyor (or their client), 
rather than under the compulsion of the State, they could not be considered to be 
produced “by, or under the direction or control of” the State. This conclusion was 
reached notwithstanding that the State had issued very detailed instructions about the 
form the plans were required to take in order to be accepted for registration. The State 
had argued that it had directed and controlled the making of the survey plans within 
the meaning of s 176 by virtue of the fact that the plans were produced to satisfy the 
legal requirements for the creation of interests in land and the public record of rights 
and interests in land; it issued detailed requirements (in legislation, instructions and 
directions) about the information required to be included in survey plans and how it 
was to be expressed; and that survey plans could only be regarded as finished upon 
being acceptance for registration by the State, following examination and amendment 
where necessary. In rejecting these arguments, Emmett J explained (at [137], [138], 
[141]):  
There can be no doubt that, before a Survey Plan can be registered and so 
become a registered plan and effect the framework for the existence of a title 
to land in New South Wales, very stringent requirements and prerequisites 
laid down by the State and its instrumentalities must be met with respect to 
the Survey Plan. In a sense, the State, by the provisions to which reference 
has been made above, directs and controls the preparation of any Survey 
Plan that is to be registered under any of the provisions so described.  
However, there is nothing in the statutory and regulatory framework that 
compels any surveyor to prepare a Survey Plan that complies with the 
requirements of that framework. Of course, it is a condition precedent to the 
registration of a Survey Plan that it does comply precisely with those 
requirements. Nevertheless, a Survey Plan that is intended to become a 
registered plan is not prepared by reason of any compulsion from the State. 
A Survey Plan is prepared by a surveyor to satisfy the contractual obligation 
of the surveyor to his client.  
... 
A person who prescribes the criteria for the registration of a Survey Plan 
does not direct or control the making of the plan. By laying down 
conditions for the grant of some privilege in respect of a work created by a 
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citizen, the State does not control or direct the making of that work. It is of 
no consequence to the State whether or not a plan that satisfies its 
requirements is lodged for registration. Section 176 is concerned with 
direction or control of the making of a work where the State has some 
reason or purpose for having the work made. A surveyor’s practice is not 
controlled or directed by the State. Section 176 is directed to the activities 
and conduct of a person who is in some way answerable to the State. 
Neither the surveyor nor their client (usually the owner of the land to which the survey 
plan relates) could have been compelled by the State to prepare, or to arrange the 
preparation of, a survey plan. Further, at any time before the registration of a survey 
plan, the owner of the land could have discontinued the application for subdivision or 
the surveyor could have declined to continue preparation of the survey plan. 
Finkelstein J agreed (at [191]) that s 176 does not apply to works “brought into 
existence by the voluntary act of the author”, notwithstanding that the work takes “a 
form dictated by the Crown if the work is to be used for a particular purpose”.  
On the question of whether the State acquired copyright as the first publisher of the 
survey plans, the court held (at [148] per Emmett J) that the plans were in fact first 
published when the surveyor provided the completed plan to the land owner for 
signature. Although the State made survey plans available to public in hard copy and 
electronic form immediately following their registration – and these acts involved 
publication of the plans by the State – this was not the first instance of publication 
which would be required for the State to acquire ownership under s 177: at [145], 
[146]. 
The finding that copyright did not vest in the State through the operation of s 176 or 
177 of the Copyright Act meant that copyright in survey plans was owned by another 
party, which would usually be the surveyor who produced the plan or the land owner 
who commissioned the production of the plan.  In the appeal to the High Court, 
Copyright Agency Limited v New South Wales (2008) 233 CLR 279; [2008] HCA 35, the 
Full Federal Court’s finding on copyright ownership was not challenged by New South 
Wales and this issue was not considered by the High Court.   
Although the nature and operation of Crown copyright was not fully explored by 
either the Full Federal Court or the High Court in CAL v NSW, the case highlighted 
the fact that it must be considered in the context of the role, powers and functions of 
government.  In considering the extent of the materials in which Crown copyright 
exists, the words “by”, “direction” and “control” must be construed in light of the 
actions of governments – what they do, direct or control – that result in the creation of 
materials within the categories of protected works and other subject matter.  Rather 
than limiting the meaning of “by”, “direction” and “control” to their literal or 
dictionary meanings, the words must be read in a constitutional context so as to 
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ascertain what materials can be considered to have been produced as a result of 
government actions falling under these headings.        
COPYRIGHT LAW REVIEW CROWN COPYRIGHT INQUIRY – A 
MISSED OPPORTUNITY 
In December 2003, the Attorney-General gave a reference to the CLRC to examine the 
law relating to government ownership of copyright material.49 An “important 
impetus”50 for the reference to the CLRC was the recommendation of the Review of 
Intellectual Property Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement (the Ergas 
Committee) in its 2000 report that s 176 of the Copyright Act 1968 be amended to 
ensure that the government is not given preferential treatment with respect to 
copyright, as compared with other parties.51 
The CLRC’s Crown Copyright report (2005)52 recommended major changes to 
government copyright ownership. A key recommendation was that the special Crown 
copyright provisions in ss 176–179 of the Copyright Act 1968 should be repealed53 
because they “are not clearly drafted and it is difficult to envisage situations where they 
would be relied upon today”, “the ambit of the ownership provisions is uncertain” and 
it is unjustifiable “for government to have a privileged position compared with other 
copyright owners”.54 The CLRC also recommended that copyright be removed entirely 
from a wide range of materials produced by the judicial, legislative and executive arms 
of government, including Bills, statutes, regulations, judgments and court orders, 
official records of parliamentary debates, reports of Parliament, and reports of 
commissions of inquiry.55  
Unfortunately, the main focus of the CLRC’s inquiry and report was narrowed down 
to the issue of copyright ownership.  Adopting a limited perspective meant that the 
CLRC avoided the core issue of the fundamental rationale for the introduction of 
statutory recognition of government copyright and how it was intended to operate.  
Rather than working from the premise that the best way to improve access to and 
                                                             
49 For information on the Crown Copyright reference, see website, n 694. The CLRC released an 
Issues Paper in February 2004, a Discussion Paper in July 2004 and received almost 80 written 
submissions, many of which are available on the CLRC website.  
50 CLRC, n 694, p xix. 
51 Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee, Review of Intellectual Property 
Legislation under the Competition Principles Agreement (September 2000) p 114: 
www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/ipcr/finalreport.pdf. 
52 CLRC, n 694.  
53 CLRC, n 694, Recommendation 1, p xxii and [9.09]. 
54 CLRC, n 694, p xxi. 
55 CLRC, n 694, Recommendation 4, p xxvi and [9.38].  
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reuse of government materials would be to shift ownership of copyright from the 
government to the private sector,56 or remove copyright from many materials 
altogether,57 a preferable approach would have been to examine the rationale for 
government copyright and how it should be managed to achieve that outcome.58  
CONCLUSION  
In the absence of provisions in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) that expressly limit or 
provide guidance on the exercise of copyright by government, it is necessary to have 
regard to the clear intention underlying the introduction of statutory recognition of 
Crown copyright. Government copyright exists primarily as a mechanism by which 
governments can ensure that documents and materials related to public and 
governmental functions are circulated in an accurate and reliable form.  The fact that 
governments can, by relying on their exclusive rights as copyright owners, restrict 
access to, and copying and distribution of, copyright materials does not mean that they 
should do so without clear justification and authority.59 Copyright is not, in itself, the 
driver of policy and practice in relation to copying, distribution and use of 
government materials and must be exercised in accordance with established 
government policies relating to the use of public sector materials.   
Government ownership of copyright does not, in itself, justify entering into a 
commercial arrangement to obtain a financial return if doing so would restrict the 
                                                             
56 For materials produced or first published under the direction or control of the government, and in 
the absence of a contract addressing the issue of ownership, this would be the result of 
implementation of the CLRC’s recommendation that the provisions relating to subsistence and 
ownership of Crown copyright in ss 176–179 of the Copyright Act 1968 should be repealed: see 
CLRC, n 694, Recommendation 1, p xxii and [9.09].  
57 For materials including Bills and Acts, judgments, records of parliamentary debates, and reports of 
inquiries, this would be the outcome of implementation of the CLRC’s recommendation that 
copyright in such materials should be abolished and they should be in the public domain: see CLRC, 
n 649, Recommendation 4, p xxvi and [9.38].  
58 See further, B Fitzgerald, Submission to CLRC on Crown Copyright (Submission 17): 
www.clrc.gov.au/agd/WWW/clrHome.nsf/Page/Present_Inquiries_Crown_copyright_Submissio
ns_2004_Sub_No_17_-_Professor_Brian_Fitzgerald; AEShareNet Ltd, Submission to the Crown 
Copyright Law Review (Submission 28): 
www.clrc.gov.au/agd/WWW/clrHome.nsf/Page/Present_Inquiries_Crown_copyright_Submissio
ns_2004_Sub_No_28_-_AEshareNet_Limited. 
59 Note that in carrying out its inquiry into Crown copyright, the Copyright Law Review 
Committee’s Terms of Reference required it to consider “the extent and appropriateness of 
reliance by government on copyright to control access to and/or use of, information”: CLRC, 
Crown Copyright, 2005 at p xii. 
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“full and free reproduction” of public sector materials.  While there are circumstances 
where copyright materials are developed at government expense and it is necessary to 
recover the costs of development in part or in full, any decision to impose charges for 
access or use should be in accordance with established policy or regulatory 
provisions.60  Nor should copyright, as a standard practice, be relied upon by 
governments for secondary purposes not directly related to the rationale for Crown 
copyright (such restricting access to government documents containing confidential 
or otherwise sensitive information. Crown copyright should, as general rule, be 
exercised to foster the dissemination of government materials in an accurate and 
reliable form rather than be used as authority for the imposition of restrictions 
designed to limit their availability and use. 
 
 
 
                                                             
60 For example, there may be circumstances where only the government possesses the expertise or 
resources required to produce a copyright work which is not required for purposes of public 
administration but is required by the general public.  Unless the government is able to recoup the 
costs involved in producing the work it may not have the incentive or authority to expend public 
monies to do so. 
